This document presents lessons and good practices identified by CIDA in consultation with its reconstruction partners in Indonesia following the Asian tsunami of December 2004. It is expected that many of these lessons and good practices will have value for future reconstruction scenarios in other countries. The aim is to provide insights into the planning and delivery of post-disaster reconstruction that can inform responses to disasters in the future.

Lessons and good practices are offered – first at the program level and then within the four sectors that were the focus of the CIDA reconstruction program in Aceh: governance, livelihoods, housing and peacebuilding. Each section offers a brief analysis of the challenge and response in Aceh/Nias then presents a number of generic post-disaster good practices.
LESSONS FROM A POST-DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION EXPERIENCE

LESSONS AND GOOD PRACTICES: PROGRAM-LEVEL

The Challenge and the Response

The earthquake and tsunami of December 2004 caused widespread devastation. In Indonesia alone, specifically the province of Aceh and the island of Nias (in adjacent North Sumatra province), nearly 167,540 lives were lost, over 570,000 people were displaced, entire villages were destroyed and physical infrastructure was severely damaged. Damages to homes and infrastructure were estimated at USD 4.459 billion.

The magnitude of the destruction posed huge challenges in delivering relief and reconstruction assistance. Northern Sumatra and Aceh Province are relatively isolated and CIDA had little prior presence in that region. The same was true for most of its partners.

Adding to the complexity of the reconstruction context in Indonesia were the social, economic, and political consequences of the ongoing conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia, which was finally settled through the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Helsinki in August 2005. The joint consequences of the disaster and the long standing conflict deeply affected all the sectors in which CIDA provided assistance.

CIDA assistance for reconstruction projects in Aceh/Nias totalled CAD 158 million. CIDA’s Tsunami Reconstruction Program in Aceh was guided by a coherent Reconstruction Strategy and focused on four sectors. It was primarily responsive in nature and was delivered mainly through a combination of Contribution Agreements and a small number of grants. The total time horizon for the delivery of Canadian reconstruction assistance was limited to four years – until the end of March 2009.

An important enabling factor was the role of the Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) in coordinating government and donor responses as well as the existence of thematic working groups for key sectors and crosscutting issues.

GOOD PRACTICES AT A PROGRAM LEVEL

• **Recognize the value of a strong government coordinating agency.** A crucial step in the coordination of a recovery process is the establishment by the national government of an agency responsible for coordinating rehabilitation and reconstruction. Such an agency, if staffed with highly skilled personnel, backed by the highest levels of government, and provided with technical assistance from the UN, bilateral and multilateral donors and NGOs can fairly rapidly take control of reconstruction coordination, information systems, NGO registration and the formulation of a transitional recovery plan, as well as developing special approval mechanisms for new projects.

• **Allocate sufficient time for post-disaster reconstruction.** Reconstruction projects are as challenging as ‘normal’ development projects but are implemented in a much more difficult context. Where natural disaster reconstruction takes place in countries already coping with
long-term conflict, an even longer term commitment is required to achieve results.

- **Ensure that the scale, scope, and expected results of projects are realistic.** It is important that CIDA and executing agencies be realistic in assessing what results can be achieved in a post-disaster context and within the established timeframe. It is better to set achievable results and meet – or even exceed – them than to be overly optimistic in defining results.

- **Provide RBM training at an early date.** To promote quality in the definition of expected results, as well as internal monitoring and results-based reporting, Results-Based Management training should be given to executing agencies as early as possible. Be prepared for at least one round of revision of results statements to bring them more into line with what is achievable in a post-disaster reconstruction context.

- **Facilitate an enabling environment for program success.** Identify areas of common need and provide the necessary analysis, guidelines, technical support, and/or capacity building on a program-wide basis. Considering the challenges of post-disaster reconstruction and the reality that executing agencies may not have experience or capacity in all areas – e.g., crosscutting issues – CIDA can promote optimal performance by providing support in strategically selected areas. For example, workshops could be offered on topics such as exit strategies and reconstruction program guidelines could be provided on crosscutting issues such as conflict sensitivity, where Agency guidelines are not yet available.

- **Develop exit strategies.** Consider what is meant by the term ‘sustainability’ in a post-disaster reconstruction context. Build into Contribution Agreements the requirement that sustainability plans and exit strategies be developed early in the implementation process and updated as necessary. Develop a CIDA exit strategy. If possible, consolidate results and enhance sustainability by continuing support through other channels after the reconstruction period ends, which can also be achieved by funding multilateral or other local organizations whose programs continue after the official intervention is complete.

- **Plan for the widest possible dissemination and institutionalization of knowledge products.** Knowledge products that result from assistance programs should form a key element of project exit strategies. All possible dissemination channels – from community radio stations to Internet websites to commercial distribution – should be considered, adapted and applied to fit the local context. Institutionalization efforts should focus on key knowledge products and ensure that their form and content are user-friendly for users in their long-term institutional ‘homes.’

- **Support funding and coordination modalities congruent with the principles of aid effectiveness.** Modalities that align funding with national plans and inputs from other donors are cost effective mechanisms and leverage opportunities for policy dialogue. They are particularly effective where a national government coordination agency is in place. Coordination is greatly facilitated where it entails close cooperation with national and local government agencies.
The Challenge and the Response

The tsunami had a tremendously negative impact on governance administration in Aceh Province, particularly on local government. An estimated 20% of civil servants perished and many buildings, facilities, and public records were destroyed or lost.

Rapid decentralization of government functions from the central to the district level across Indonesia, together with passage of the 2006 Law on Governing Aceh granting special autonomy to Aceh and the 2005 peace agreement, added complexity to the development situation, while at the same time providing new opportunities for governance reform.

CIDA responded with governance projects aimed at restoring selected government capacities, rebuilding civil society organizations and strengthening the relations between government and civil society. Projects worked with municipal, district and provincial governments, community groups, universities, NGOs and other institutions.

GOOD PRACTICES IN GOVERNANCE

- **Balance short-term responses with longer term programming.** In post-disaster situations, the provision of funds for the rapid purchase of equipment necessary to support technical assistance activities can be critical. This helps ensure high quality outcomes, builds good working relationships, and can leverage the value of technical assistance. Linking the selective and limited provision of equipment and infrastructure to other capacity building activities in a post-disaster environment not only improves existing procurement procedures, but also provides incentives for establishing procedures to help local communities undertake similar initiatives. The relationship is symbiotic, as capacity building cannot take place without adequate attention to infrastructure needs. For instance, in post-disaster/post-conflict situations where government systems are in serious need of rehabilitation or improvement, it is useful to provide limited quantities of rapid-disbursing funds to support technical assistance activities in parallel with infrastructure and equipment. Such provisions should be based on written agreements with local governments to adequately maintain and operate any equipment or infrastructure provided from such funds. Usually these funds are needed only during the first one or two years of a reconstruction program.

- **Adopt a focused approach with geographic concentration.** Programs should be well focused and avoid attempting to achieve too many diverse objectives. The latter phenomenon is a common tendency for donor projects faced with the overwhelming challenges of post-disaster and post-conflict situations. Geographically concentrated programs, with increased potential for synergetic relationships, also tend to have a greater impact than those scattered across several regions.
• **Encourage and facilitate civil society-government cooperation.** Encouraging and assisting civil society and government to work together on developing solutions to jointly identified problems, after strengthening relations of trust, is a very effective approach to implementing reconstruction programs. A wide variety of opportunities exist for communities, CSOs and government (both the administrative and legislative branches), to work together and share information during established annual and mid-term planning and budgeting processes, as well as through specially created forums and focal points. For example, what is needed to improve service delivery can be thoroughly evaluated through public debate and discussion. CSO networks and alliances can be assisted in engaging not only with local governments but also with local government associations to distribute messages more widely, including at higher levels of government. Building relationships between civil society and government through such cooperation can lead to a new generation of leaders that considers transparency, inclusion and cooperation as ‘good politics.’

• **Build on existing efforts.** Identifying, modifying and applying a spectrum of pre-existing capacity building materials (e.g. training manuals for gender-responsive budgeting) from across the country and a wide variety of local and donor-assisted programs is more cost-effective than developing new materials and tools from scratch. Doing so requires incorporating time and staff resources into project/program design for networking, coordination and integration of activities with those of other donor agencies, government entities, CSOs and the private sector.

• **Emphasize coordination to address new challenges.** The establishment of new forums linking the administrative and legislative branches of district and municipal governments across a province can successfully promote coordination and focus on issues of common concern vis-à-vis the province (and the national government). These forums can function within an atmosphere that is free from partisan politics, even where members of the forum come from opposite sides of the civil-state conflict. Flexible government-civil society coordination mechanisms, such as joint government-CSO committees, can also support development and reconstruction efforts while rebuilding trust and cooperation.

• **Seize opportunities for women’s empowerment.** Post-conflict/post-disaster environments provide special opportunities to open up new spaces for women to assume leadership roles and for government to integrate women as central actors within their capacity development strategies. Seizing this potential requires close attention to social analysis, particularly gender analysis, to ensure that gender issues and those of marginal groups are adequately researched, analyzed and reflected in resulting recommendations, policies and legislation.

In post-disaster/post-conflict situations governance projects that either adopt gender mainstreaming approaches or analyze and address challenges posed to gender equality principles in relation to religious practices and local culture are often more successful than those that do not. This is due not only to increasing women’s participation, but also rendering government policy, practices, systems and procedures more gender responsive.

However, gender equality-related targets such as those focused on increasing women’s participation in local governance and decision-making roles, should be realistic, while considering that women may have been disproportionately affected by the related disaster or conflict.
LESSONS AND GOOD PRACTICES: HOUSING

The Challenge and the Response

In Aceh and Nias (North Sumatra) 120,000 houses were destroyed while another 70,000 houses were damaged. The overarching context for housing reconstruction efforts in Aceh and Nias was complex and challenging, not only as a result of the tsunami’s material consequences (e.g. loss of records, massive destruction of transportation infrastructure, loss of village sites to the sea necessitating relocation), but also due to 30 years of conflict with the Indonesian government that led to mistrust of outsiders and a severe deterioration of trust and cooperation within communities.

The policy environment (e.g. criteria defining entitlement to houses, introduction of the Aceh Building Code, policy regarding rebuilding close to the coast) changed over the course of the reconstruction period. The demand for building materials accompanying the massive rebuilding effort led the provincial government to declare a logging moratorium, which added to existing challenges in sourcing materials in a legal and environmentally responsible fashion. The commitment to “build back better” had to take into account the location of both Aceh and Nias in earthquake prone zones, necessitating the design of houses with a reasonable degree of earthquake resistance. Slow land acquisition, registration and house certificate issuance processes significantly delayed implementation, particularly in the case of relocation sites.

GOOD PRACTICES IN HOUSING

- Recognize that transitional shelter allows time to plan permanent solutions. It is important that all parties, particularly beneficiaries, understand that the provision of good quality, safe, secure, permanent housing takes time. Transitional shelter corresponding to SPHERE standards should be part of the resettlement process to give victims adequate interim housing while allowing time for reconstruction of permanent communities and shelter to be planned and implemented properly.

- Closely cooperate with local and national government authorities. It is important to recognize and support the coordination function of national and local government authorities. Government appointed post-disaster reconstruction agencies offer important coordination functions in housing reconstruction by setting standards, facilitating approval processes, and/or monitoring quality. Liaison with local government authorities, such as district heads, facilitates processes involving local government offices and stakeholders (e.g. expediting purchase of land for resettlement) and helps to mitigate and mediate conflicts that arise in the course of implementation.

- Calculate the costs and risks of taking on relocation sites. Relocation sites are typically more difficult and costly to manage. Specific challenges include: land acquisition, beneficiary acceptance, and substantial site preparation.
• **Adopt an integrated approach to housing reconstruction.** Housing projects, whether on relocation or original sites, should adopt a holistic approach to building back better to create viable communities. Viability depends on a number of factors, including access to livelihoods, potable water, basic health and education services and access roads. Beneficiaries are likely to abandon their new homes if basic services and livelihood opportunities are unavailable.

• **Invest time and effort in getting the design right.** Sufficient time must be invested up front to ensure that designs meet technical standards that are acceptable to and appropriate for their intended communities. This presents various challenges, including pressure from beneficiaries, who may not have patience for the time required to ensure that designs meet appropriate structural (e.g. earthquake resistance) and environmental standards. Meeting such standards and complying with building codes, where they exist, is an effective way to mitigate the impact of future disasters, while ensuring sustainability. An important dimension of getting the design right is taking into account the environmental footprint, including the use of environmentally friendly materials. Where government post-disaster coordination agencies are tasked with setting standards, getting the design right may include lobbying those authorities regarding the socio-cultural appropriateness of standards (e.g. house size or layout, or lot size).

• **Concentrate reconstruction efforts geographically.** Housing reconstruction projects that take on a number of geographically dispersed locations, each with different physical and social characteristics, are considerably more complex to manage. These challenges grow exponentially with the addition of each new location. Geographic concentration allows executing agencies to focus more attention on building relationships of trust with communities that are disaster-affected – and possibly conflict-affected as well – and on involving and empowering beneficiaries.

• **Maximize beneficiary participation.** In general, the more intensive the community engagement in reconstruction planning, house design, beneficiary selection and construction management/oversight, the greater is the beneficiaries’ sense of ownership of and satisfaction with their new homes, and the higher are occupancy rates. Effective community engagement in housing reconstruction initiatives requires considerable time, skill, patience, creativity, persistence and resources, particularly where communities are both disaster- and conflict-affected. An important element of a participatory approach to reconstruction is the maintenance of strong communication linkages with beneficiaries. This requires ongoing analysis of the most effective mechanisms and channels, which must be tailored to women, men, vulnerable groups and the unique character of each community.

• **Adopt rigorous quality control and quality assurance procedures.** A well developed and systematically implemented Quality Control and Quality Assurance system is essential to maximizing the quality of houses provided to beneficiaries and ensuring that technical standards are met while limiting environmental impact. This system should include formal and structured handover procedures and documentation. An important dimension of sustainability is equipping beneficiaries with the information they require to maintain the quality and structural integrity of their core home. This could be in regard to maintenance, (particularly in cases where unfamiliar materials have been used), safe renovation procedures, and maintaining structural integrity while making additions.

• **Ensure gender equality provisions are integrated into planning structures.** Women's active involvement in housing design, beneficiary selection, construction management/oversight, and housing committees is a critical element of the future sustainability of completed housing projects. Women's effective participation can be achieved through developing practical gender equality action plans, recruiting specialist technical resources, and ensuring the implementation of action plans from the outset, with all team members sharing accountability. Messages concerning gender-related issues must be made clearly and also directed to men to elicit their support for gender equitable processes and results. Gender equality plans may include provisions such as encouraging co-ownership of new homes. Gender equality plans need to be realistic, taking into account local realities, e.g. demographic imbalances resulting from the disaster.
• **Develop appropriate conflict management procedures.**

Capacity to deal effectively with conflicts arising through housing reconstruction projects has a great impact on results achievement and sustainability. Conflicts can easily arise through land tenure disputes, particularly with returning internally displaced persons. Disputes over materials and construction quality can lead to significant implementation delays. Conflicts may also arise between community members and contractors and/or their labour forces. Effective conflict management and resolution systems depend on transparency and on close working relationships with community and local government leaders who can help prevent conflicts and serve as effective mediators. Other conflict management mechanisms include complaint centres and community-based project staff that can identify and address potential conflicts early on.
The Challenge and the Response

Estimated losses due to the tsunami included: 20,000 hectares of coastal aquaculture farms destroyed, 60,000 hectares of farmland rendered temporarily or permanently unproductive, and 100,000 small and medium enterprises destroyed or damaged. In addition to direct losses, e.g. fishing boats, livelihoods were also compromised indirectly by the destruction of fragile coastal ecosystems such as mangrove swamps.

These losses were compounded by the effects of 30 years of conflict and the accompanying isolation of the Aceh economy, which had already seriously weakened the local economy.

GOOD PRACTICES IN LIVELIHOODS

• Differentiate between the early relief/recovery and reconstruction phases. Approaches that are appropriate for meeting immediate post-disaster needs (e.g. cash for work, stipends for participating in training) tend to create dependence and are not optimal means of supporting long-term livelihood reconstruction. Experience indicates that five to six months following the disaster is the earliest point at which livelihoods reconstruction initiatives should be introduced.

• Coordinate responses. Consensus on a common set of ground rules for livelihood reconstruction and coordination of efforts can go a long way toward reducing unnecessary dependence on donors, ‘competition’ for beneficiaries, and a market saturated by the excessive supply of very similar products.

• Coordinate baseline data collection and market analysis. Timely planning of effective initiatives in a post-disaster context is greatly facilitated by the availability of reliable baseline data and analysis that is as comprehensive as possible. These functions can be more effectively conducted by donors or a sectoral working group than by each executing agency working individually and serve to rapidly establish the context for livelihood reconstruction efforts.

• Strike a balance between ‘building on the known’ and introducing new possibilities. Community interests and donor reconstruction efforts generally focus on restoring lost livelihoods, e.g. building on pre-disaster subsistence and entrepreneurial activities. Executing agencies should also be encouraged to add value to their interventions by identifying innovations with good potential for both increasing incomes and providing sustainable livelihoods. Whether familiar or innovative, selection of enterprise types should pay particular attention to viability, sustainability, and potential for expansion. Time invested in making sound up front assessments and introducing beneficiaries to possibilities beyond returning to their pre-disaster livelihood activities can offer good results, despite the challenges that doing so entails in post-disaster reconstruction situations.
• **Develop exit strategies that include strong partnerships with local agencies.** Linkages with local government and business development agencies, whether government or non-governmental, can help sustain results, especially considering the relatively short timeframe for post-disaster reconstruction support. Local inputs may include technical support, provision of capital/financial support, and institutionalization of good practices.

• **Recognize that even small-scale enterprises may pose local environmental risks.** A simplified, scaled down Environmental Impact Assessment should be conducted for small-scale enterprises to identify and analyze both potential environmental risks and opportunities to introduce and promote principles and practices of good environmental management. Post-disaster situations offer an opportunity to introduce communities/entrepreneurs to more environmentally conscious production techniques that minimally ‘do no harm’ and potentially provide more sustainable or lower cost alternatives not previously known locally (e.g. organic agriculture, alternatives to wood burning brick kilns).

• **Make livelihood initiatives vehicles for women’s empowerment.** Post-disaster/post-conflict contexts offer opportunities for raising awareness of gender equality issues in local communities and promoting women’s empowerment through livelihoods initiatives. Gender analysis is necessary to identify both opportunities and constraints in particular local contexts (e.g. where the disaster has contributed to severe demographic imbalances). Maximizing potential empowerment benefits generally requires offering additional support beyond income generating opportunities. This could include leadership training tailored to women as well as the flexibility to adapt training schedules to women’s multiplicity of needs and roles.
LESSONS AND GOOD PRACTICES: PEACEBUILDING

The Challenge and the Response

The impact of the earthquake and tsunami was compounded by thirty years of civil war between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) that destroyed trust and cooperation between government and communities throughout the province. It left a legacy of fractured communities, in addition to the challenge of reintegrating ex-combatants and political prisoners into societal structures. Thus post-disaster reconstruction was complicated by very low levels of the trust needed for positive collective action within communities, as well as in civil society collaboration with government.

Despite many years of conflict, the tsunami sharpened the will of all parties to create a more enabling environment for disaster recovery. The Government of Indonesia signed a Memorandum of Understanding for peace with the GAM in Helsinki on August 15, 2005, which led to passage in 2006 of the Law on Governing Aceh. Peace has been largely maintained and played a major role in the success of reconstruction efforts.

While the coastal areas struck by the tsunami were for the most part also conflict-affected, large areas of the province were severely conflict-affected but not eligible for the post-disaster reconstruction assistance that flooded in.

CIDA responded with projects aimed specifically at supporting peacebuilding processes in Aceh. These focused on promoting peace education and mediation skills through Islamic educational institutions as well as on fostering harmony in conflict-affected communities by facilitating democratic processes to identify, implement and manage locally driven women's and community-wide projects. In addition, conflict sensitivity was identified as a crosscutting issue to be integrated into all CIDA-funded projects.

GOOD PRACTICES IN PEACEBUILDING

• Tailor peacebuilding efforts to the local context. Peacebuilding is a complex process and needs to be adapted to unique local situations. Targeted capacity development, taking local conflict dynamics into account and aiming to transform them, is crucial if gains made during this process are to be sustained. Communities/beneficiary groups can be effectively engaged in analyzing local conflict dynamics and building/rebuilding local mediation mechanisms. It is essential to develop a solid understanding of the nature and dynamics of the local institutions involved, especially where these (e.g. rural religious schools) have specific, leader-centered cultures of their own, creating challenges for sustainability and replication.

• Combine peacebuilding initiatives with programs providing tangible peace dividends. Peacebuilding initiatives are more likely to be effective when they are integrated with...
programs that address collectively identified needs (health, education, housing, etc.) and provide tangible peace dividends. Furthering peace through the implementation of local livelihoods and community infrastructure projects is a feasible and effective strategy. However, it is equally important to explore the promotion of peacebuilding through local cultural activities (e.g. ceremonies, drama, etc.).

• **Direct assistance to both conflict- and disaster-affected communities.** Tensions can arise when disaster-affected populations receive aid while others look on empty handed. Both disaster-affected and conflict-affected populations need to be integrated into post-disaster reconstruction programs in conflict-affected environments in order to avoid undermining tenuous peace processes.

• **Realistically identify challenges in institutionalizing peace curriculum.** Short-term peacebuilding programs heavily focused on training as a primary tool for supporting long-term peace and reconciliation efforts may not be sustainable. In order to be effective, changes – such as the introduction of peace education courses into school curriculum – must be institutionalized. This requires not only long-term commitment on behalf of the donor (e.g. to allow adequate time for several iterations of training, followed up by adequate coaching) but also sustainable program funding, well-resourced education sector government agencies, and local commitment to introducing curriculum changes. In the absence of these elements, such curriculum changes are not likely to have a discernable impact on peacebuilding processes or to extend beyond the project’s pilot communities.

• **Develop exit strategies that link peacebuilding initiatives with other reconstruction projects and with local government systems.** Networking and interaction between peacebuilding projects and reconstruction projects in other sectors can provide useful opportunities for synergy and for enhancing the achievement and sustainability of results. Similarly, projects must be creative in identifying appropriate linkages with local government development delivery, policy-making, regulatory and justice systems in order to both sustain project results and promote reform.

• **Appropriately integrate gender equality into the peacebuilding process.** Promoting gender equality in the sense of equitable participation in peacebuilding processes and equitable access to peace dividends can produce positive results if carried out in a manner that is sensitive to local cultural and religious norms. For instance, women’s community management and decision-making capacities can be strengthened through a two-pronged approach that provides for separate women-only initiatives in addition to community-wide initiatives. Such an approach has a strong likelihood of being welcomed and not being subject to major criticism by local religious leaders. Efforts to promote gender equality in contexts that are simultaneously post-conflict and post-disaster must be based on careful analysis of the effects of each – and the combined effects of both – on gender roles and relations. For example, while women may have taken on roles that would be normally considered men’s during the conflict, the disaster might have resulted in demographic imbalances, leading to a preponderance of adult males in affected communities.
• **Be sensitive to risks of creating new conflict.** Regardless of whether post-disaster reconstruction is implemented in areas that are also conflict/post-conflict zones, proactive conflict sensitivity measures should be incorporated into all projects. In conflict/post-conflict areas, such measures will help to deal with socio-economic and political repercussions of the conflict. In areas that are not conflict-affected, the provision of post-disaster assistance can generate conflict. Explicitly defined conflict sensitivity measures can prevent project implementation from generating or exacerbating conflict and also equip partners and community members to resolve or mediate any conflicts that may arise.

• **Address conflict sensitivity systematically for maximum effectiveness.** As with other crosscutting issues, measures to address conflict sensitivity should be based on careful analysis, formulated as an explicit strategy/action plan and supported by specialist resources. In order to promote effective approaches, it is useful for CIDA to provide guidance to executing agencies about what constitutes a good conflict sensitivity strategy/action plan.